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MULTIPLICITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER¹

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It is generally assumed that in fighting Germany we were fighting a specific doctrine of life. Many crusaders are now in search of the doctrine which has brought on this iniquitous war. To hunt down the German philosophy has become a favorite indoor sport. But what is the result? The result threatens to blur all distinctions. The adjective "German" now connotes everything and denotes nothing. If, for instance, the national *differentia* of both German philosophy and German politics be Egotism, as has been maintained, many doctrines having their origins outside the boundaries of Germany would have to be defined as "German." Again, if Germany's national trait be "Absolutism" in logic and morals (and this too has been seriously held), what shall we do with Belgium? Shall we call her German because in defiance of all consequences she remained *absolutely* true to her duty? Not Germany but Belgium is the nation that acted in conformity with Kant's Categorical Imperative. If it is true that America's national philosophy is pragmatism, then the "masters" of Germany are entitled to American citizenship. It is

¹ An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 22, 1918.

Germany who has rejected absolute standards of right and wrong, or truth and error. Her official documents, are they not essays in applied pragmatism? In them we shall find exemplified the pragmatic notions of truth and goodness. Only in a world in which truth is fluent and changing can yesterday's sacred pledge become today's "scrap of paper." And who knows whether today's treaty of peace will not become *spurlos versenkt* tomorrow! It would take but little mental agility to link the crimes of Germany not only with pragmatism but with any and every philosophy.

The truth is that philosophies are not essentially national, nor are nations essentially philosophical. Philosophic attitudes are general. They can be correlated with national tendencies in but a very superficial and arbitrary way. Idealism, for instance, is an attitude which finds voice among all nations, in all ages. The same holds of materialism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, mysticism, and all the other definable views. To establish a definite one-to-one correspondence between nations and philosophic systems is to mutilate the facts of history. Nations as well as philosophic doctrines grow and change, acting and reacting upon one another. A system of ideas which may be said to predominate in a nation at one period is at another eschewed by it. The ruling philosophy of one people soon gains mastery over another. The fortunes of Platonism come here to mind. A more recent instance is the pilgrimage of Hegel's philosophy. The type of idealism to which Hegel gave expression became the dominant philosophy in England and America not long after its collapse in Germany. And the intimate relation between pragmatism and the Greek Sophists is another instructive example. Shall we, in the manner of the Germans, speak of *unser* Protagoras, or shall we count Mr. John Dewey among the Greeks?

I am intentionally indulging in these vagaries to show how slippery is the field of *Rassenlehre* and *National-Kultur*. It comes perilously near being the home of the sophist and the partisan. Unrestrained imagination masquerading as "science," what can it not prove? There is no "race" or "nation" which could not be selected as the protagonist of all nobility or all baseness. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's book (*Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*) should serve as a terrible example. As Josiah Royce remarks: "When men marshal all the resources of their science to prove that their own race-prejudices are infallible, I can feel no confidence in what they imagine to be the result of Science."² We also agree with him that "no race of men . . . can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can now know with exactness to be unchangeable."³ There is nothing in the inherent nature of one race or nation which makes it immune from the vices or the crimes of another. In our eagerness to be different from the Germans we are in danger of becoming like them in emulating the superficial and capricious methods of their race-theorists. Let us leave it to them to inoculate philosophy with a racial or national "culture."

The issues of philosophy are too grave for facile theories. So are the issues of the war. The war is a struggle of general ideas of which there are exponents in every nation and some of which come to predominate now in this, now in that country. Racial and national conflicts themselves may be interpreted in terms of a deeper opposition. There are after all but a few fundamental problems, towards which there are but a limited number of ultimate attitudes. One such problem, of which the war of nations is only one instance, is the problem of multiplicity. And this problem is as general as it is

² Race Questions and Other American Problems. New York. 1908. P. 9.

³ Ibid. P. 47.

fundamental. It is everywhere forced upon us. We have but to open our eyes to see it reflected in a thousand shapes. Nature with its manifoldness exhibits it; the inner life with its diversity of moods, passions, and motives discloses it; the social order with its variety of institutions, forces, laws, interests, and claims bares it; the world with its many lands, races, nations, states, cultures, and creeds displays it. The world is everywhere multiple and diverse. This is the universal situation. And it is this situation which creates our significant problems, practical as well as theoretical. The problem of individual ethics is the problem of choice. In a world in which there is possible but one course of action, no moral perplexity can exist. There is a problem of social morality because there are many of us. Were there but one individual, no social questions would arise. And in a world made up of one nation only, there would be no international disputes. The problems of science have meaning because many and various and complex phenomena call for interpretation. Without a multiplicity and diversity of facts to reduce to law and order, science itself would evaporate. And philosophy — what is it but an effort to reconstruct the meaning of a world in which many antitheses and contradictions seem to prevail? The work of philosophy consists in formulating the many problems of life and of reality and in appraising the validity of opposed solutions.

Thus fundamental and universal is the problem of multiplicity. It is a problem of experience as well as one of reflection. It enters every domain of life and of reality. Were multiplicity to vanish, nothing would remain. Without its aid no problem could be articulated. It is important, therefore, to sketch the attitudes which may be assumed towards the world so essentially multiple. And in terms of these attitudes, which I wish to describe in a fashion deliberately unconventional and untechnical,

the problems of the Social Order will appear in a new light.

One attitude towards the fact of multiplicity may be called the collectionistic. As the word implies, it consists in viewing the world as a collection. The world is made up of a number of things, distinct and often antagonistic in their nature. They just happen to be together. Heterogeneous and incongruous in essence, such a world resists our efforts to unify and harmonize its colliding parts. All the tragedies of life as well as its comedies have their source in a universe whose constituent elements or forces are, in the words of William James, "multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed." Warfare in such a world is not only natural but inevitable. Collision is the order of the day. The inner life with its antagonistic instincts, passions, and purposes, illustrates it. Nature everywhere is a struggle of contending creatures. Life is a play of hostile forces in which the equilibrium is frequently upset. It is absurd to look for stability and fixity in a world so essentially heterogeneous. Anything may happen in a pluralistic universe. Chance often shapes the course of man's life. A petty incident may decide the fate of nations. This will affect different temperaments differently. To Thomas Hardy, to take a literary instance, the world because of its incongruities is essentially tragic. Life is subject to the irrational collision of circumstances. No man can control the convergence of facts that may bring about his ruin. But life's collisions, so intensely tragic to Hardy, are for George Meredith, as well as for Anatole France, a source of intellectual delight, zest for the "Comic Spirit." But whether tragic or comic, collectionism is a universal view, of which philosophy and literature contain various expressions.

Another and a quite different attitude is the mystic's. The mystic admits that to our unscrutinized experience

the world presents itself as a collection of heterogeneous and incongruous parts. But he questions the verdict of uncritical experience. How do we know that our universe is pluralistic? No doubt our sensory and reflective knowledge so avers. We look, and what we see are diversities; we reflect, and what we achieve are complexities. But our eyes may be blind, our reason dull. Not the universe but our vision of it may be distorted. That reality is other than our ordinary experience of it has always been the mystic's contention.

"I found Him not in world or sun
Or eagle's wing or insect's eye,
Nor through the questions men may try,
The petty cobwebs we have spun."

To an experience trained to eschew the ways of sense and of reflection, which are both deceptive, reality is revealed in its true light. It stands forth as a transcendent unity, one and whole, uncompounded and indivisible. Deeper than discord is unity, deeper than difference is identity, deeper than contrast is uniformity. Multiplicity is appearance. So reports the mystic. His argument does not here concern us. But his faith will be seen to have a bearing far from innocuous upon the social questions of the day.

Thus antithetical are the two views of multiplicity. For collectionism the real nature of the world is heterogeneity, for mysticism it is homogeneity. A third view is exhibited by romanticism. Restricted to the problem of multiplicity, romanticism seems a compound of collectionism and mysticism. At its root is a double evaluation of all things. To the romanticist everything is at once grotesque and symbolic. Everything is hideous, but everything is also a source of mysterious beauty. The worth of things resides not in their intrinsic reality but in their power to suggest hidden meanings and mystic splendors. The romanticist gazes upon the world through

disparate eyes. He at once recoils from it and clings to it. He rejects the world as an independent order, having a dignity and stability of its own, but he passionately loves it as a symbolic expression of his longing and desire. "The everlasting universe of things," so Shelley in *Mont Blanc* expresses the romantic view of multiplicity,

"The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark, now glittering, now reflecting gloom,
Now lending splendor. . . ."

This quotation is typical. All things are now dark, now glittering. Between these two extremes the romanticists constantly fluctuate. Theirs is a "double vision" of life. To Byron, in *Manfred*, the world is

"A wandering mass of shapeless flame,
A pathless comet, and a curse,
The menace of the universe;
Still rolling on with innate force,
Without a sphere, without a course,
A bright deformity on high,
The monster of the upper sky."

And yet how beautiful is the same world in another mood! "Beautiful," cries *Manfred*,

"How beautiful is all this visible world!
How glorious in its action and in itself!"

In this double evaluation of the world, voiced by every romantic poet, we have the key to all romanticism. From it may be derived almost all the romantic conceptions of life and of art.⁴ But of this nothing can here be said. Our concern is with the connection between the problems of the Social Order and the romanticists' "double vision." This connection we shall soon note.

Yet a fourth attitude towards multiplicity remains to be suggested. It is the classic attitude. For classicism

⁴ Cf. the writer's *Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato*, in *The Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1917. Vol. X, No. 3, pp. 215-236.

multiplicities are crude material to be fashioned into significant wholes. Discord is inevitable where there is no controlling purpose. Chaos reigns without significant organization. But the world of things is plastic. It can be moulded. Confusion may be made to submit to order. This is seen in art and in science, where inchoate masses are cozened into form and law. To bring multiplicities under form and law — this is the ideal which dominates classicism. This is the essence of classic life and art. Multiplicities and diversities seemingly opaque and stubborn yield to the genius of organization and become transformed into harmonious structures, such as works of art, well-ordered souls, well-regulated cities and States. And in such orderly structures the constituent parts do not lose their unique character. On the contrary, the whole presupposes for its very unity and harmony a variety and complexity of parts. This distinguishes classic from mystic unity. The former is compounded of multiplicity, the latter is conceived in opposition to it. Without distinct and various parts, but ordered and controlled by a central purpose or principle, there can be no whole, as classicism views it. This is exemplified in Plato's well-ordered State, as well as in Greek tragedy or sculpture. The essence of personality, as taught by both Plato and Aristotle, consists in such organic union. And, despite the mystic and romantic tendencies in Plato, the Greek's universe is a cosmos. "Philosophers tell us," says Plato in the *Gorgias*, "that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and the universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule." In the classic notion of a whole composed of various yet interdependent parts, equality and difference are singularly combined. The different parts are equally constitutive of the whole. Equality does not mean mystic homogeneity, nor is

difference the same as incongruity. Save for the equal coöperation of the different parts there would be no whole; and the parts achieve individuality and significance only by thus being coöperating members. Plato's *Republic* may again be cited as instance. But it is the structure of the whole Greek view of life, at the root of which is the notion of organic unity. The harmonious adjustment everywhere of whole and part, of unity and plurality, of equality and diversity — this is classicism.

So much for a general sketch of four possible attitudes towards multiplicity, in terms of which many types of plurality may be interpreted. The inner life of man, for instance, may be viewed as a manifold of incongruous elements, as "a heap or collection" — so Hume expressed it — "of different perceptions"; or it may be identified with a solitary uncompounded and unchanging soul, substance, spirit, monad, or self; or it may be severed, as in Goethe's *Faust* and Byron's *Manfred* and Victor Hugo's *Mahomet* and certain religious and ethical doctrines, into two discordant lives — a higher and a lower, a nobler and a baser; or it may be fashioned and woven into an ordered, balanced, and harmonious personality.

And the State, in its legal or political sense, may it not be considered in the light of these distinctions? "Deeply convinced," says Maitland in his introduction to *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, by Otto Gierke, "deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and 'natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man upon one level."⁵ The history of Political Theory might well be conceived as a struggle of our four ways of viewing multiplicity. Is the State a compound of single units — "a sum of presently existing individuals bound together by the operation of their own wills"⁶ — a collection of "contract-bound men"? Is the State

⁵ *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. P. xi.

⁶ *Ibid.* P. xxiii.

an independent spirit, a sort of mystic entity, a transcendent unity, and therefore beyond good and evil? Is the State a "juristic" person, a *persona ficta*, but as such possessing "symbolic" and not "real" personality? Or is the State a group-person, with a group-will, acting as a living organism? And since "it wills and acts by the men who are its organs, as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth, and hand,"⁷ must we not attribute to it genuine personality that is subject to moral evaluation?

In these questions are bound up the momentous issues of the day. Legal and political ideas of supreme significance for the peace of the world are here forced into opposition. Is the State logically prior to Law, or is Law logically prior to the State? Is the will of the State ultimate, or is there an authority, legal or moral, which ranks superior to the will of the State? Is or is not the State capable of criminal acts? These questions cannot be answered without determining the character and the reality of the State. As a mere collection of detached individuals it is irresponsible; as a mystic being, existing as a sort of Platonic Idea, the State transcends the moral judgments which bind human individuals; as a "fictitious" or "symbolic" or "hieroglyphic" personality which is and is not an individual, the State again eludes responsibility. Truly romantic is this "double evaluation" of the group. As *persona ficta* the State has all the privileges with none of the responsibilities of a person. But if the State is neither a collective name, nor a transcendent Idea, nor a fiction or symbol, but a person in the ethical sense, or an organized individuality, as Plato conceived his Republic, then the State can sin as do individuals, and is subject to the same moral restrictions as are its individual members. "That ancient saying," remarks Maitland, ". . . which bids the body politic fear no pains in another world represents profound beliefs.

⁷ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xxvi.

Notwithstanding all that we may say of 'national sins' and 'the national conscience' and the like, a tacit inference is drawn from immunity (real or supposed) to impeccability, and, until they are convinced that . . . States can sin, many people will refuse to admit that a State is a thoroughly real Person with a real will."⁸ The culpability or non-culpability of the State—the burning question with regard to Germany's invasion of Belgium—stands or falls with the philosophical definition of its reality. We are here face to face with a profound issue, significant alike for metaphysics and legal and political theory. It is perhaps the most central issue of the war. Collectionism, mysticism, romanticism, and classicism in political theory have been engaged in combat. Which theory will win? The moral view of the State, the view that places State and Man upon the same level, will be in the ascendant if Germany is forced to repudiate and to reverse her official judgment that "necessity knows no law." Only then will the State emerge as an ethical individuality in Plato's sense, and in the sense of recent writers, such as Gierke and Maitland. Only on the theory that the State is an ethical "group-person" can legal and moral restrictions be placed upon it. Legal and moral responsibility of the State is thus bound up with the definition of its real nature.

To discuss the problem of the State in detail would require more learning than I possess in political or legal theory. It is here mentioned merely to suggest that the issues which centre around the State would gain in coherence and philosophic significance could they be viewed in connection with the more general problem of multiplicity. The problem of the State is essentially a problem in multiplicity. And the four attitudes towards it have their legal and political expressions.

⁸ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xl.

But let us pass to the vexing question of nationalism, now so much in the foreground of the world's attention, and see whether our four attitudes are applicable to it. What is nationalism? No word is today more vague and yet more potent. For things that are "national" men lay down their lives. Men die that the "nation" shall not perish. For the sake of "national" honor and "national" existence individuals repudiate their own honor and waste their own existence. In some hearts national feeling burns with a religious glow. Our age has witnessed an outburst of national emotions comparable in intensity and depth with that of the religious passions of the past. The psychologist and the historian and the economist tell us *how* all this came about. The rise and the growth of national consciousness can undoubtedly be "explained." We know that there are causes, of an economic, historical, and psychological nature. But "causes" merely confront us with the same fact in new forms. A cause of a fact is the same fact connected with another fact. It is not the explanation but the meaning of the fact we wish to grasp. What meaning, what significance, what value has nationalism? Here we face a question which admits of a variety of answers. And no light matter is here at stake. Nothing less than war or peace, anarchy or civilization, may result from the answer which men give, in terms of conviction or of action, to the question of nationalism.

I make no pretence to understand the meaning of nationalism. I am only interested in some of its logical implications. A nation immediately presents itself to our minds as a certain unity in plurality. One national spirit is supposed to bind together a multiplicity and diversity of individuals. Men and women sundered from one another by almost impassable gaps constitute a single nation. Unlike in physical and mental characteristics, unlike in personal heredity and training, unlike in

religious belief and practice, unlike in moral and intellectual ideals, unlike in purpose and in thought, yet they all possess a common nationality. Different and heterogeneous in every other respect, in nationality they are identical and homogeneous. Here indeed is the ancient problem of the One and the Many with a vengeance! And let it not be said that this is mere dialectical jargon, "vicious intellectualism," a Socratic puzzle of universal and particular, of identity and difference. Social and practical consequences of grave importance lie concealed in this puzzle. One rule of life accrues from emphasizing the individual differences of men and women, and quite another results from insisting upon their national similarities.

There are some who hold that what differentiates men is deeper than what unites them. The world is a world of individuals. And individuals are qualitatively distinct. Individuals *qua* individuals are incommensurable. To give them group-marks, to tag them with national labels, is to blot out their individual distinction. There is among men a natural and inevitable distance. To emphasize what they have in common is to do violence to their inner nature. There are many forms of this type of individualism, of which Nietzsche's is perhaps the most familiar. "The individual," says Nietzsche, "is something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation of his actions in himself, because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional words and notions."⁹ This is a typical expression. Individuality is uniqueness. Individuality is difference. The "pathos of distance" is a universal fact. No likeness of language or of other social habits and activities can obliterate it. National values, forming as they do

⁹ *The Will to Power*; trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici. 1900. P. 215.

the basis of a collective life and thus being inimical to individual ideals, would seem to belong to those values that demand revaluation. Zarathustra thus voices his contempt for the State: "The State, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the bad; the State, where all lose themselves, the good and the bad; the State, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life.'" ¹⁰ "And whither shall I now ascend with my longing," asks Zarathustra. "From all mountains do I look out for fatherlands and motherlands. But a home have I found nowhere; unsettled am I in all cities, and decamping at all gates. Alien to me, and a mockery are the present-day men . . ., and exiled am I from fatherlands and motherlands. Thus do I love only my children's land, the undiscovered in the remotest sea; for it do I bid my sails search and search." ¹¹ The individualist is homeless. National values are social values, and as such to be surpassed. "Mankind! . . ." cries Nietzsche in a well-known passage entitled *We Homeless Ones*, "no, we do not love mankind! On the other hand, however, we are not nearly 'German' enough . . . to advocate nationalism and race-hatred. . . . We prefer much rather to live on mountains, apart and 'out of season,' in past or coming centuries. . . . We homeless ones are too diverse and mixed in race and descent as 'modern men.' . . . We are, in a word — and it shall be our word of honor! — good Europeans." ¹² Thus wrote the man alleged by some to be responsible for the German war! "This artificial nationalism," writes Nietzsche in another place, "is . . . dangerous . . . for it is essentially an unnatural condition. . . . It is first of all the interests of certain princely dynasties, and then of certain commercial and social classes, which impel to this nationalism; once we

¹⁰ Thus Spake Zarathustra; trans. by Thomas Common. I, XI.

¹¹ Ibid. II, XXXVI.

¹² Joyful Wisdom; trans. by Thomas Common. Sec. 377.

have recognized this fact, we should just fearlessly style ourselves good Europeans.”¹³ In a world that is a collection of diverse and mixed and heterogeneous individuals there can be no room for racial or national *units*. Artificial for Nietzsche are all racial and national boundaries. Nothing is final or unchanging in a fluent and pluralistic world. Not national but individual types contend for mastery in his collectionistic universe. In Nietzsche — the collectionistic individualist *par excellence* — we have thus a negation of nationalism. The great exemplars of mankind are human and not national or racial representatives. They owe allegiance to no particular fatherland or motherland. The ultimate abolition of national frontiers seems a natural consequence of Nietzsche’s doctrine. The Superman — the goal of all life — would be endowed with human or superhuman traits peculiar to no single race or nation.¹⁴

Extremes often meet. A view which in every respect is the very antithesis of Nietzsche’s shares his anti-nationalism. It is represented by many Socialists today. “A radical clergyman in New York City,” so Mr. John Spargo relates in his article on *Socialism and Internationalism*, “obsessed after the manner of his profession by a passion for symbolism, places all the flags of civilized nations in an iron pot over a fire and ‘melts’ them. He then pretends to draw from the pot a red flag, symbolic of international Socialism, and unfurls it to the breeze amid the cheers and plaudits of the hypnotized followers. This much-exploited ceremonial was intended to symbolize the passing of nations, and their replacement by a world-organization undisturbed by the lingual and cultural distinctions which divide the world into na-

¹³ Human, All Too Human; trans. by Helen Zimmern. Sec. 475.

¹⁴ On Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism, consult Nietzsche the Thinker, by William M. Salter, New York, 1917; Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany, by Herbert Leslie Stewart, London, 1915; and the article on Nietzsche by Havelock Ellis in Vol. IX of *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Ed. by J. Hastings.

tional groups.”¹⁵ Thus the “plebeian herd” vie with the “masters of the world” in renouncing national allegiance. It is rather ironical that Nietzsche’s Herren and Sklaven should share at least one ideal. Zarathustra is homeless. And Nietzsche himself prefers to be identified with those that are *heimatlos*. Now Marx in his *Communist Manifesto* long ago declared, “*Die Arbeiter haben kein Vaterland.*” But how different are the motives of the “herd” from those of the “masters”! Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism is the expression of a collectionistic view of the world. Inequality, diversity, heterogeneity are of its very core. Change is the essence of life, militant individualism its moral law. Only thus can arise new and more powerful exemplars of mankind. A militant mysticism, on the other hand, seems to lie at the root of anti-national socialism. Its aim is equality. Its ideal is homogeneity. Its purpose is uniformity. “Marx argued with force,” to quote Mr. Spargo once more, “that the development of international industry and commerce tends ever to bring about identity of industrial processes and consequently ‘uniformity in modes of life.’ This, he prophesied, would lead inevitably to the disappearance of national peculiarities and contrasts, of national feeling and patriotism.” Just as the philosophic and religious mystic aims to reduce our pluralistic universe to an identity of substance, to a unity undisturbed by difference or distinction, to a uniformity untroubled by competing and changing elements, so the industrial mystic, if I may so call the revolutionary socialist, seeks after a social substance that is identical, homogeneous, and uniform. From such a social substance all distinction of rank and caste must be eliminated, all discrimination of classes removed, the contrast of capital and labor abolished. All inequalities — political, economic, social, religious, racial, national — must be

¹⁵ Atlantic Monthly for September, 1917. Pp. 300-312.

forever eradicated. Far deeper than the multiplicity, diversity, and variety of human types and classes and groups is human solidarity. Human solidarity — this is the passionate ideal which dominates the “class-conscious” worker. But it is an ideal whose fulfilment depends upon the extinction of the other classes. Relentless class-struggle is therefore an inevitable condition.

“C’est la lutte finale!
Marchons tous, et demain
L’Internationale
Sera le genre humain!”

The class-war has the significance of a holy war. It is viewed as a struggle between Humanity and its enemies. But *one* class truly represents “the people.” Not until the men and the groups that are not “the people” are crushed, not until the levelling of classes is accomplished, will peace reign on earth. Class differences are inimical to human solidarity and must be ruthlessly abolished. And here we see once more the analogy between the proletarian and the philosophic mystic, not only in the result but in the method of obtaining it. The speculative mystic institutes a reign of terror in his inner life. To his goal leads a “negative way.” Before the One Reality can become revealed to the unique and luminous vision of the mystic, the cognitive impediments of sense and of reason must first be removed. There can be no peace with one or the other dominating. Sense and reason which corrupt and debase reality must be pitilessly extirpated. But this reign of terror will be followed by the peace that passeth understanding. All strife will give way to perfect stillness and harmony. Nirvana will open its portals. All will be well. And so with the proletarian mystic. The One Social Substance cannot be compounded of its present elements. The ideal of human solidarity requires a purgative process. The

regeneration of society demands its complete revolution. No compromise with the enemy! Capitalism must be exterminated. The bourgeoisie must be abolished. "Vested interests" and the parties and the factions and the policies representing them must be uprooted. But all this is the "negative way" of the Proletarian Revolution. All this is preliminary to the final stage of social perfection, of universal *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Thus, through a *via negativa*, shall we enter the social Nirvana. And no flippancy is intended in noting the analogy between the function of the mystic syllable *Om* and that of the guillotine of the Social Revolution. They both serve to suppress the revolt of sense and of reason.

The two types of anti-nationalism here suggested are to be interpreted as ideals in terms of which the present corrupt social order is to be reformed. They involve endless warfare. Being radical and revolutionary, they demand a complete revision of the established values, and in my mind they are correlated with philosophic collectionism and mysticism. But two different views of nationalism may now be distinguished on the basis of the romantic and the classic interpretations of multiplicity. At the root of romanticism I find a double standard of values. From one point of view things are symbolic or representative of a higher order; from another they are grotesque or sordid or corrupt. The oscillation between the symbolic and the grotesque, between the superior and the inferior, I regard as the very *differentia* of romanticism. Applied to nationalism we find it exemplified when, as some one has well said, "the members of each nation believe their national civilization to be Civilization."¹⁶ Thus the exclusive nationalism of one's own country is regarded as spiritual and ennobling, that of the foreigner narrow and selfish. Difference in national

¹⁶Quoted by E. Barker in *Political Thought in England*. Home Univ. Lib. P. 22.

civilization or culture is interpreted in terms of inequality. One's own national culture is regarded as different because of its inherent superiority. There is but one true civilization, one genuine culture, and *one* nation most perfectly embodies it. This is the voice of Chauvinism. And it is Chauvinism which leads one to a double or romantic evaluation of the same national ambitions or purposes. The commercial enterprises of the foreign nation, for instance, are the adventures of "shop-keepers"; those of one's own are expressive of an ideal mission, of a deep desire to save mankind through a superior efficiency and organization. From the German point of view the British merchants are predatory exploiters; the Germans are the knights-errant of *Kultur*.

While no country is immune from this romantic nationalism or Chauvinism, while it has its prophets and poets in France and in England and in the United States, it seems to have taken root more deeply in modern Germany than in any other land. The romantic words of her ruler are now "classic": "The trident must pass into our hands" — "We are the salt of the earth" — "The German nation alone has been called upon to defend, cultivate, and develop great ideas" — "Our German nation shall be the rock of granite on which the Almighty will finish the work of civilizing the world. Then shall be fulfilled the words of the poet: 'German character shall save the world.'" ¹⁷ But these arrogant and imprudent utterances of William II are the harsh echoes of like sentiments voiced by Sybel, Giesebrecht, Treitschke, Droyesen, Häusser, and others.¹⁸ "The Prussian School of historians," says J. A. Cramb, "has written the history of Germany as the exposition of a single divine idea — the movement towards unity under

¹⁷ Quoted by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 166.

¹⁸ Cf. *Germany and England*, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. Pp. 32 ff.

Prussia, not of a new empire, but of a new phase of empire.”¹⁹ But why should Germany aspire to unchallenged world-supremacy? Treitschke’s answer is a perfect expression of romantic nationalism. “What nation,” asks Treitschke, “will impose its will on the other enfeebled and decadent peoples? Will it not be Germany’s mission to ensure the peace of the world? Russia, that immense Colossus with feet of clay, will be absorbed in its domestic and economic difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her colonies break loose and exhaust themselves in fruitless struggles. France, given over to internal dissensions and the strife of parties, will sink into hopeless decadence. As to Italy, she will have her work cut out to ensure a crust to her children. The future belongs to Germany, to which Austria will attach herself if she wishes to survive.”²⁰ Such is the language of Chauvinism. The day of the other nations is over. Their race is run. “Enfeebled and decadent,” they must be surpassed. It is Germany’s mission to assume control over the destinies of the world. A recent volume, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg* (1915),²¹ contains articles by leading German scholars concerning their nation’s position as *Weltmacht*. Here we have a most unblushing exhibition of a “double standard” — the essence of romantic nationalism. Germany is depicted as standing for all that is spiritual, pure, and noble; her enemies for all that is material, gross, and selfish. I have no time for extended quotations. A few specimens must suffice. “We believe,” says no less a person than Professor Ernst Troeltsch, “that we are the people who are striving for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does

¹⁹ Cf. Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. P. 34.

²⁰ Germany, France, Russia, and Islam (Eng. Ed.). P. 17. (Quoted by J. Holland Rose in op. cit. P. 163.)

²¹ Translated by W. W. Whitelock, under the title *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War* (New York, 1916), from which the quotations are taken.

violence to none and brings freedom to all";²² whereas on the side of Germany's enemies, "the whole situation is merely the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial world-supremacy."²³ "Englishmen will learn," asserts Professor Hermann Schumacher, "that there are higher forces in national life than cold-blooded desire for gain."²⁴ "The longing of the German people," so he continues, "is only to gain a freer field for the exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. . . . Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind."²⁵ "We are not only fighting," avers Professor Otto Hintze, "for our own power and independence, . . . but for the freedom of all nations."²⁶ England, however, contends Professor Erich Marcks, "is fighting for a universality of power, which in reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern world has seen."²⁷ Professor Friedrich Meinecke draws the contrast between his nation and its enemies thus: "We do not think nor act more harshly or more arbitrarily than others, but we do think more straightforwardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a difference between our way of thinking and theirs."²⁸ "We are . . . the nation," concludes in all earnestness Professor Gustav von Schmoller, "capable of doing most for the advancement of international law and international arbitration."²⁹ But what of Belgium? The sublimest expression in modern history of national self-

²² The Spirit of German Kultur, in op. cit. P. 88.

²³ Ibid. P. 67.

²⁴ Germany's International Economic Position, in op. cit. P. 140.

²⁵ Ibid. P. 140.

²⁶ Meaning of the War, in op. cit. P. 622.

²⁷ England's Policy of Force, in op. cit. P. 317.

²⁸ Kultur Policy of Power and Militarism, in op. cit. P. 577.

²⁹ The Origin and Nature of German Institutions, in op. cit. P. 217.

sacrifice for an ideal elicits this from the pen of Professor Karl Hampe: "There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of their ruling classes."³⁰

From these remarkable essays enough quotations have been selected to show the essentially romantic spirit pervading modern Germany in her nationalism. The alien nations are inferior, unspiritual, sordid, corrupt, perverse, swayed by base motives, possessed by tyranny and lust, warring for ignoble aims; Germany alone is "the protagonist of civilized mankind," the symbol of spiritual perfection, striving for genuine progress, struggling for true independence and freedom, fighting for the supremacy of a superior civilization. The spread of Germanism — since Germanism is thus identified with all that is noble, good, and beautiful — becomes then a sacred duty. Violence and force are but means justified by the ideal end. For a "chosen" people there are higher duties than those imposed by law and morality. A nation elected to save the world must not be measured by the same standard to which "inferior" nations are bound. A "double standard" is inevitable. "Necessity knows no law" simply means the necessity of the superior nation or race in fulfilling its world-mission. "To Treitschke, as to Mazzini," says Mr. Ernest Barker, "'nation is mission'; but to Treitschke the mission of a nation is the extension of national culture, and — since power is the vehicle of culture — the extension of national power."³¹ From this point of view nationalism is essentially aggressive. Competition of national powers and national "missions" must in the end lead to friction. Friction leads to strife. Strife, such as the present, leads to an assault upon civilization by the very nations who claim to be its self-elected champions.

³⁰ Belgium and the Great Powers, in op. cit. P. 379.

³¹ Political Thought in England, Home Univ. Lib. P. 239.

The danger of romantic nationalism lies in the assumption that difference is inequality. Difference in national culture is interpreted as difference in kind and in value. The alien nation is different and peculiar and *therefore* on another level. Individual distinction and mental isolation from the other nation is the Chauvinist's ideal. Nietzsche's "pathos of distance" is transferred from individual persons to individual nations. In its national rather than in its individual exemplars lies, according to the Chauvinist, the goal of mankind. Civilization is identified with but one national form. It is the chosen people that has a monopoly of genuine culture. The result is a diversity of national cultures contending for mastery. Here is a new collectionism in which the antagonistic units are not individuals but nations. In a world peopled with national "souls," each conscious of its unique genius and its special mission, international rivalry and strife is a normal condition. Each nation will struggle for a dominating position. Each nation will claim a sovereign place for its superior culture. Each nation will seek to carve out its "manifest destiny." Bernhardi's *Weltmacht oder Niedergang* — world-power or ruin — would seem the only alternative for nations living in a world of competing nationalities. The history of the past with its wars and its woes is the history of national collectionism, each member more or less swayed by romantic nationalism.

The escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism seems to lie in two opposite directions. Internationalism based upon the negation of national differences and distinctions is one alternative. The other is internationalism founded on the organization and co-ordination of national diversities. The two forms of negative internationalism already considered — that of radical individualism and that of revolutionary socialism — insisting as they do on a complete revision of the

present order, lead to endless individual or class warfare. National distinction is to be eliminated either by widening the distance between individuals or by pressing them into a uniform mould. In either case, the process is one of violence. Social pluralism inaugurates strife among individuals; social monism institutes the struggle of classes; and war remains the law of life. From this intolerable situation the ideal of organization offers itself as an escape. Disorganized groups are bound to collide as do disorganized individuals. But, like individuals, nations may be made to yield to rational organization. It is a pity that the term organization now shares with that of efficiency a certain odium. But it is absurd to condemn a principle because of the mechanical and predatory use made of it. What is needed is more rather than less organization, organization of the classic type, organization that is rational and free. An organization of free nations should do for the individual groups what a democratic and well-ordered community does for its individual members — the substitution of coöperation for aggression. The classic ideal of organization, exemplified in Plato's *Republic* but extended and applied to national units, will give rise to a new internationalism. This new internationalism will not require nations to melt, to blend, or to fuse their different characteristics. On the contrary, whatever unity or distinction, historical or psychological, national cultures may be said to possess will be preserved in a democratic society of nations. It is of the essence of democracy that difference in political, social, and religious ideas does not constitute inequality or inferiority. A whole of the classic or democratic type (I use the adjectives in this connection as synonymous) has a singular logical structure. It combines heterogeneity and equality. The heterogeneous elements of an organized whole are not mutually antagonistic, nor does their equality of action preclude difference in individual

constitution. Synthesis of diversity and unity — this is the distinguishing mark of an organization. What Kant said of an organism may be applied to any organized whole. “An organism,” says Kant, “is an assemblage of active and differing parts such that each is both end and means to the whole and to every other part.”

There is no time to show how Kant's definition of an organism expresses with perfect precision the classic ideal of life and of art. Nor is there time to show in detail how this ideal, applied to international organization, is at the basis of his essay on *Perpetual Peace*, in which “he proposed as the chief step towards peace a Federation of free States. They must be Republics, i.e., they must be States endowed with really representative institutions — which would rule out all forms of Bonapartism with their modern equivalent, Kaiserism. These free States would form definite compacts one with the other, thus laying the foundation for a system of International Law, binding on all, and thereby substituting the reign of right for merely national aims. Just as individuals had by degrees consented to give up something of their entire liberty so as to secure order, similarly (he urged) it ought to be possible to substitute some measure of international control for that extreme ideal of national liberty which often led to war.”³² “The social relations between the various peoples of the world,” observes Kant — and how accurately does his observation apply to the case of Belgium! — “in the narrower or wider circles, have now advanced everywhere so far that a violation of Right in one place of the earth is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a Cosmo-political Right of the Whole Human Race is no phantastic or overstrained mode of representing Right.”³³ A state of peace, according to him, “cannot be founded or secured without

³² Summarized by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 179.

³³ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 103-104.

a compact of the Nations with each other. Hence there must be a . . . Pacific Federation. . . . This Federation will not aim at the acquisition of any of the political powers of a State. . . . For States viewed in relation to each other there can be only one way . . . of emerging from [the] lawless condition which contains nothing but occasions of war. . . . Reason . . . [must] drive them to give up their savage and lawless freedom, to accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and thus to form an ever-growing State of Nations, such as would at last embrace all the Nations of the earth.”³⁴ “It was a German thinker,” remarks the English historian Rose, “who in 1795 pointed towards peace, while France headed towards wider conquests — and Bonapartism.”³⁵

The internationalism of Kant — internationalism based upon the organization or federation of different but equally free peoples — has its modern champion in the President of the United States. President Wilson has in a number of his messages to Congress voiced with eloquence and force the need of international organization. Only a few passages can here be cited. On April 2, 1917, President Wilson, speaking for our nation, declared, “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” In his message of December 4, 1917, he again speaks of a “partnership of nations,” which he insists must be a “partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.” In such a partnership the different nationalities should have equal rights. This is emphasized in his letter to the Pope, August 27, 1917. Thus: “Peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful — their equal rights to freedom and security and self-government.” The same

³⁴ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 97–100.

³⁵ *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 183.

idea recurs in the message of January 8, 1918: "We wish her [Germany] only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world — the new world in which we now live — instead of a place of mastery. . . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." "What is at stake now," our President reiterated on February 11, 1918, "is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice, no mere peace of shreds and patches. . . . Without that new order the world will be without peace, and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development." The similarity of these utterances with those of Kant is too obvious to require comment. Both President Wilson and Kant aim at a "perpetual peace," and both point to the same method of bringing it about. Here then is an escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism. It lies in the creation of a "new international order," in the formation on equal terms of a "league," a "partnership," a "concert," of different democratic peoples. It is Josiah Royce's conception of the Great Community translated in terms of constructive statesmanship. And this Great Community will henceforth be the champion of our common civilization. Civilization will cease to be the monopoly of single and "chosen" nations. It will become the united effort of organized humanity, the common fruit of a Social Order that is a World-Order.

Is this a mere ideal? It is, if by ideal is meant a goal still distant to which our personal and national activities should be directed. It may be very difficult to attain. But in this sense all other modes of changing the present order are ideals and difficult to attain. Militant individualism is an ideal; the supermen who shall inherit

the earth are not yet in sight. The Nirvana of the Proletarian Revolution is an ideal; the capitalists and the bourgeois are still at large. Riotous and romantic nationalism is an ideal; there still are strong and self-conscious nations unsubdued. The ideal of a society of nations is no more than the other ideals difficult of attainment. And it commends itself because it seeks to substitute peace for the sword, coöperation for violence, civilization for barbarism.

The present struggle is to my mind a struggle of the four ideals which this Essay has endeavored to suggest. One may not connect them as I do with the general attitudes towards the problem of multiplicity. He may prefer to describe them in more conventional ways. But the ideals themselves — name them what you will — one cannot fail to recognize. Individualism, militant or pacific, has everywhere its vociferous or sullen representatives; Revolutionary Socialism is now asserting itself with grim determination; Lawless Nationalism is still undefeated. But among the Allied Peoples, now intimately united for the defense of civilization, a new ideal makes itself heard with increasing definiteness, the ideal of an organized humanity, of an international community. Which ideal will prevail? No one can foretell. But the President has spoken for our nation. We are fighting that the ideal of a new international order *shall* prevail.